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Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc.: Standing to Sue 
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933; 
Reflections on Gustafson· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the stock market crash in October 1929, the face and 
structure of the stock market began a radical transition period. 1 The total 
value of the stock market plunged from a high of $89 billion in October 
1929 to $15 billion in 1932.2 In 1933, Congress responded by passing the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") and a year later the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act")? However, enacting a law is 
only the beginning. Determining how to apply the law is usually much 
more difficult. 
One such problem escalated with Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.4 The 
United States Supreme Court held in Gustafson that in order to have 
standing to sue under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, one must have 
purchased stock in an initial public offering.5 Since that ruling, there 
have been conflicting opinions as to whether the same restriction applies 
to claims falling under section 11 of the same Act.6 While many district 
courts have decided this issue, only one circuit has addressed it - the 
Ninth Circuit in Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, lnc.7 In Hertzberg, the 
court held that Gustafson was not applicable to a section 11 claim.8 Thus, 
an investor need not have purchased stock in an initial public offering to 
* Copyright © 2000 by James E. Shapiro. 
I. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURlTIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 3. 5 (2d ed. 
1997). 
2. See id. at 5. 
3. See id. 
4. 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
5. See id. at 576, 584. 
6. Compare Gould v. Harris, 929 F. Supp. 353, 359 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding Gustafson 
applies to section II claims), and Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(holding Gustafwn applies to section II claims), with In re Websecure, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 
364, 367-68 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding Gustafson does not apply to section II claims), Schwartz v. 
Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 545, 554-57 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding Gustafson does not 
apply to section II claims), and Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (holding Gustafwn does not apply to section II claims). 
7. 191 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1999). 
8. See id. at I 082. 
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have standing to sue under section 11. This case note analyzes the 
Hertzberg holding and discusses the different arguments used by district 
courts that came to the opposite conclusion. The case note ultimately 
concludes that Hertzberg is correct. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to appreciate the Hertzberg decision, a basic understanding 
of Gustafson is required. Additionally, an understanding of the 
similarities and differences between section 11 and section 12 of the 
1933 Act is necessary. 
A. The Gustafson Decision 
A basic understanding of Gustafson is required in order to determine 
if its decision applies equally to section 11 and section 12 claims. In 
1989, Gustafson, McLean, and Butler (collectively "Gustafson"), the sole 
shareholders of Alloyd, Inc., decided to sell their company .9 Wind Point 
Partners II, L. P. ("Wind Point") and others agreed to purchase all issued 
and outstanding stock through a holding company, Alloyd Holdings, Inc. 
("Alloyd Holdings"). 10 After the sale, Alloyd Holdings' earnings were 
significantly lower than the earning estimates relied upon during 
negotiations. 11 Unhappy with their purchase, Alloyd Holdings and Wind 
Point sued Gustafson claiming that "the statements made by Gustafson 
and his coshareholders regarding the financial data of their company 
were inaccurate, rendering untrue the representations and warranties 
contained in the contract." 12 They further argued that "the contract of 
sale was a 'prospectus,' so that any misstatements contained in the 
agreement gave rise to liability under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act." 13 
The case eventually made its way up to the United States Supreme Court 
which ruled, inter alia, that section 12 was limited to initial public 
f:l' • 14 d d . d h . I . 15 o 1enngs an eme t elf c atm. 
9. See Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 564. 
10. See id. at 564-65. 
II. See id. 
12. /d. at 565-66. 
13. /d. at 566. 
14. "Initial public offering" as used in this case note means "public offerings by issuers and 
their controlling shareholders." See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 576. There are two categories of 
offerings, and within each category, two types. The two categories of offerings are public and 
private. Public offerings are offerings made to the public at large. These types of offerings are highly 
regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Private offerings are offerings made to a 
specific group of investors. In the majority of cases, as long as companies follow specific rules, no 
filings to the SEC are required. Within each category of offerings there are two types, initial and 
secondary. Initial offerings are offerings that come directly from the issuing company or a 
controlling shareholder. Any other transfer of a security after the initial offering is a secondary 
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In makings its decision, the Supreme Court noted that, in general, the 
1933 Act deals only with public offerings. Yet Congress specifically 
made an exception for section 17. The Supreme Court held that because 
Congress had specifically made an exception for section 17, but did not 
specify an exception for section 12, section 12 is bound by the general 
rule and is limited to initial public offerings. 16 
In deciding Gustafson, the Court did not address the issue of whether 
one had to have purchased securities in the initial public offering in order 
to have standing to sue under section 11 of the 1933 Act. 17 Rather, the 
Supreme Court was dealing with section 12(2). Yet, because of their 
comparison between the legislative history of the two sections and some 
comments made in the two dissenting opinions, district courts are split on 
whether the same limitation applies to section 11 claims. 18 
B. Sections 11 and 12 
With a basic understanding of the Gustafson decision, a comparison 
of section 11 and section 12 is helpful. The Supreme Court has noted that 
"[i]n the wake of the 1929 stock market crash and in response to reports 
of widespread abuses in the securities industry, the 73d Congress enacted 
two landmark pieces of securities legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 
(1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)."19 
Wisely, the authors of the two acts decided not to focus on how to handle 
fraud after discovering it, but rather on how to prevent fraud from 
occurring. Thus, the main focus of the Acts is disclosure of information. 
However, without penalties, no law is effective. Thus, the two acts 
provide penalties for those who fail to follow their stringent 
requirements. Section 11 20 and section 1221 are express remedies made 
available by the 1933 Act. 
offering. Thus, an initial public offering is one that is made to the public at large and is made by the 
company or its controlling shareholders. 
15. See id. at 566, 576, 584. 
16. The Supreme Court said: 
[T]he legislative history ... showed that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure 
from the general scheme of the Act in this one instance, and "made abundantly clear" its 
intent that § 17(a) have broad coverage. No comparable legislative history even hints that 
§ 12(2) was intended to be a freestanding provision effecting expansion of the coverage 
of the entire statute. The intent of Congress and the design of the statute require that § 
12(2) liability be limited to public offerings. 
ld. at 577-78 (citations omitted). 
17. See id. at 566. 
18. See cases cited supra note 6. 
19. Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994). 
20. Section II of the 1933 Act provides in part that: 
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
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There are three major differences between section 11 and section 12. 
The first, and seemingly most obvious, is the infraction each was 
intended to cure.22 Section 11 deals with untrue statements or omissions 
of material fact found in the registration statement,23 while section 12 
deals with untrue statements or omissions of material fact found in a 
"prospectus."24 While on its face this is a major difference, the Gustafson 
decision minimized this difference by altering the definition of 
"prospectus."25 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition 
he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, sue .... 
(e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be to recover such damages as shall 
represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price 
at which the security was offered to the public) and (I) the value thereof as of the time 
such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of 
in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have been disposed 
of after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages 
representing the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the 
price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time 
such suit was brought. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). 
21. Section 12 of the 1933 Act in part provides that: 
(a) Any person who-
(2) offers or sells a security ... which includes an untrue statement of material fact or 
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ... shall be liable subject to 
subsection (b), to the person purchasing such security from him .... 
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
22. See infra note 24. 
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 771. It is important to note that, at least prior to the Gustafwn decision, 
there are two different types of prospectuses under the Act, an "informal" prospectus and a "formal" 
prospectus. An "informal" prospectus is defined as any communication, written or oral, which offers 
any security for sale. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(10) (1994 & Supp. 1998). A "formal" prospectus has 
specific content requirements found in the Act, see id. § 77j, and is used during the usual process of 
a public offering. See id. § 77e (1994 & Supp. 1998). Section 5(b) forbids the disclosure of any 
information, even if it is not an offer, without a valid registration statement unless the information 
conforms to the requirements of a "formal" prospectus. See 15 U.S.C § 77e(b). Because the process 
of obtaining a valid registration statement is a long process, companies issue communications in the 
form of "formal" prospectuses prior to a valid registration statement to disseminate information 
about the upcoming offering. However, if the communication does not meet the requirements of a 
"formal" prospectus, it is considered an "informal" prospectus and the company has violated the 
1933 Act. 
25. See supra note 24. An "informal" prospectus can arise during either a private or public 
offering while a "formal" prospectus can only arise in a public offering. Because an "informal" 
prospectus can arise during a private offering, the scope of section 12 (pre-Gustafson) was wide 
enough to include a cause of action under a private offering. In contrast, the only time a registration 
statement is required is during a public offering which limits the scope of section II to public 
offerings. When the Gustafson decision took away the "informal" prospectus it limited section 12 
claims to "formal" prospectuses and in doing so, limited the scope of section 12 to public offerings. 
Thus, Gustafson took away a major difference between section II and section 12. 
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The second major difference between section 11 and section 12 lies 
in the different requirements for updating the information covered by the 
respective sections. For a registration statement, the information 
enclosed, and only that information, must be kept accurate after the 
registration statement effective date.Z6 Thus, as long as the registration 
statement is accurate as of the effective date, only the information 
contained in the registration must be kept current. The same is not true 
for section 12. Anytime a prospectus is issued, it must accurately reflect 
the condition of the company at the time the prospectus is issued.27 It is 
important to note that a prospectus must meet the requirements of section 
10,28 which requires the same information as the registration statement.29 
Thus, if after the effective date, the registration statement does not 
contain "a material fact necessary in order to make the statement, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading,"30 the issuer must update the registration statement through 
the prospectus to avoid liability under § 12(a)(2).31 The distinction is a 
subtle one but nonetheless important. If the issuer leaves a fact out of its 
registration statement and prospectus that was not necessary at the time, 
but later becomes necessary, the issuer does not have a duty to add it to 
the registration statement but does have such a duty with respect to the 
prospectus. 
The last major difference between section 11 and section 12 is that 
different individuals can be held liable for violations of the respective 
sections. Section 11 lists all of the potential defendants-a very 
expansive list.32 Under section 12, the only person who can be sued is the 
person who actually offered to sell or sold the security.33 The potential 
defendants list is much broader under section 11 than section 12. 
With a basic understanding of sections 11 and 12 and with a 
knowledge of Gustafson, a discussion of Hertzberg. 34 can be undertaken. 
Prior to Hertzberg, no circuit court had addressed whether the scope of 
section 11 was limited by the Gustafson opinion.35 
26. See Cox ET AL .• supra note I, at 312. The effective date is the date on which the SEC 
gives its OK to proceed. 
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
28. See Gustafwn. 513 U.S. 561. 
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994). 
30. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2). 
31. See Cox ET AL., supra note I, at 310. 
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(l )-(5) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 771. 
34. 191 F. 3d I 076 (9th Cir. 1999). 
35. The Eighth Circuit had an opportunity, but refused to do so. See Parnes v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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III. FACTS 
Dignity Partners, Inc. ("Dignity") approached individuals with 
terminal illnesses, the majority of which had contracted AIDS, and 
purchased their life insurance policies. This gave the terminally ill 
customers much needed cash to live more comfortably the remainder of 
their shortened lives.36 At first the business endeavor was successful, but 
Dignity soon encountered a problem they had not anticipated. A major 
source of Dignity's business was comprised of people with AIDS. With 
the discovery of drugs that prolonged the lives of individuals suffering 
from AIDS, Dignity was no longer able to adequately predict their 
customers' life expectancies.37 In order for Dignity's business to be 
profitable, Dignity had to be able to predict, with a certain degree of 
accuracy, how long the customers were going to live.38 With customers 
living longer, Dignity had to wait longer than originally anticipated to 
collect on their customers' outstanding policies.39 This caused both 
immediate and long-term cash problems.40 
Prior to common knowledge of the widespread use of these life 
prolonging drugs, Dignity went public.41 Shortly after, however, public 
awareness heightened, causing Dignity's stock to plummet.42 Once stock 
prices dropped, Howard Hertzberg and two other investors ("Hertzberg") 
filed a class action lawsuit claiming, among other things, that Dignity 
knew of the new drugs on the market and knew of the effect it would 
have on the company before it went public but intentionally left that 
information out of the registration statement in violation of section 11 of 
the 1933 Act.43 
Dignity filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Hertzberg 
had not purchased the securities in the initial public offering, the suit was 
barred under Gustafson.44 The district court, ruling from the bench, 
granted the motion. Hertzberg appealed to the Ninth Circuit.45 
36. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-5, Hertzberg, 
191 F.3d at 1076 (No. 98-16394). 
37. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-5, Hertzberg 
(No. 98-16394). 
38. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Hertzberg (No. 98-16394). 
39. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-6, Hertzberg 
(No. 98-16394). 
40. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Hertzberg (No. 98-16394). 
41. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1077. 
42. See id. at 1077-78. 
43. See id.; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Hertzberg (No. 98-16394 ). 
44. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078. 
45. See id. 
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IV o REASONING 
In deciding the case, the Ninth Circuit first looked to the plain 
meaning of section 11.46 The relevant portion of section 11 states that 
"any person acquiring such security" may sueo47 Looking first to 
Webster's Dictionary, the court focused on the word "any" and 
concluded that it meant "ALL" persons acquiring such security, subject 
only to the limitation that they purchase "such securityo"48 The court 
further held that this limitation only requires that the purchaser trace its 
security back to the initial offering encompassing the false statement.49 
The court then focused on the damages provisions of the section, 
which states that "[t]he suit 0 0 0 may be to recover such damages as shall 
represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not 
exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public)" and 
the price at the time of trial.50 Based on the fact that Congress put in a 
provision that provided for a price other than the initial offering price, 
the court reasoned that Congress's intention was for this to apply to 
secondary transferso51 The court concluded by quoting Gustafson, "We 
will 'avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant. "'52 
Finally, the court rejected Dignity's argument that the restriction set 
forth in Gustafson applied to section 11 claims based on the fact that the 
Court in Gustafson was not dealing with a section 11 claimo53 The court 
went further by stating that "the [Supreme] Court gave no indication that 
it intended this restriction to apply to section 11."54 The Hertzberg court 
further noted that since the decision was issued, no circuit court had 
changed its analysis of section II claims, and that only three district 
courts had disallowed standing to sue under section 11 at that timeo55 
46. See id. at I 079-80. 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
48. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986)). 
49. See id. (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)). 
50. !d. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)). The statute actually defines three alternative points to 
measure the price difference; however, for the purposes of this discussion, the price at the time of 
trial is sufficient. 
51. See id. 
52. !d. (quoting Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 574). 
53. See id. 
54. !d. 
55. See id. at I 081. The Ninth Circuit listed two district courts in addition to the district court 
that it reversed. See id. (listing Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 353, and Gannon v. Continental Ins. Co., 920 
F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1996)). Prior to Hertzberg, the only circuit court that had the opportunity to 
look at the issue refused to do so. See Parnes, 122 F.3d at 539. 
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The Hertzberg decision was simply a reiteration of the Ninth 
Circuit's traditional way of interpreting a section 11 claim. But is it the 
correct view, particularly in light of Gustafson? 
V. ANALYSIS 
Prior to Gustafson, courts were split on the scope of section 11. 
Many courts followed the more expansive interpretation found in the 
Second Circuit's decision, Barnes v. Osofsky,56 which limited standing to 
sue to those investors who could "trace" their securities to a defective 
registration statement. 57 The "trace" principle not only allows standing to 
investors who purchased their securities during an initial public offering, 
but also gives standing to investors who purchased their securities on the 
secondary market and can trace their securities back to a defective 
registration statement in an initial public offering. Notwithstanding the 
Barnes decision, other courts limited section 11 's scope to only those 
investors who purchased their securities in an initial public offering with 
a defective registration statement, denying any investor who purchased in 
the secondary market. 58 
Even after the Gustafson opinion, courts remain split on the scope of 
section 11. Each side continued to use the same basic arguments as 
before. These arguments rely upon the legislative history of the 1933 
Act, comments found in the majority opinions of both Gustafson and 
Naftalin, comments found in the dissenting opinions of the Gustafson 
opinion, and the statutory text of section 11. Each of these arguments are 
discussed below. 
A. The Legislative History of the 1933 Act 
The Legislative History of the 1933 Act is by far the biggest weapon 
used by those who have eliminated or simply never adhered to the 
"trace" principle set forth in Barnes and supposedly eliminated by 
Gustafson.59 Yet both sides claim the legislative history supports their 
proposition. 
56. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967). 
57. See PPM Am. v. Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970 (D. Md. 1993); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. 
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. I 992); In re E1scint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374 (D. Mass. 
1987); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Cal. I 986); Gibb v. Delta 
Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130 
(D.N.J. 1984); Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984); Turner v. First Wis. 
Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899 (E. D. Wis. I 978). 
58. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682,691 (3d Cir. 1991); In re 
Delmarva Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del. 1992); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 607 n.1 (S.D. Ill. 1978). 
59. Of the nine cases that interpreted Gustafwm as eliminating the "trace" rule examined in 
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Those who would limit section 11 's scope to initial offerings point to 
the Gustafson opinion where the Court noted that sections 11 and 12 
have similar legislative history.60 They argue that because both sections 
came from the same legislative history, the analysis under Gustafson 
should be applied the same way for section 11 as it was for section 12.61 
This reasoning has two problems. First, section 11 and section 12 apply 
to two distinctly different situations. Second, if these courts were to read 
further in the legislative history, they would discover that the same 
legislative history they quote cuts out an exception to the general rule for 
claims under section 11. 
Sections 11 and 12 not only differ in requirements to file suit but also 
in those who may be sued. While it is true that they do have many 
similarities (particularly after Gustafson), to claim that because they have 
the same legislative history they should be treated the same is one more 
step toward abrogating the need for two separate sections. If this trend is 
followed, sections 11 and 12 will soon be indistinguishable. 
The majority of those who claim Gustafson reversed the "trace" 
principle62 look to the legislative history dealing with the 1933 Act in 
general, which states, "The bill affects only new offerings of 
securities .... It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities 
unless such redistribution takes on the characteristics of a new 
offering."63 The proponents of the "trace" principle correctly 
acknowledge that the legislative history indicates that the 1933 Act deals 
generally with initial offerings of securities.64 However, they point out 
that the same House Report later states "that § 11 remedies are available 
'regardless of whether [plaintiffs] bought their securities at the time of 
the original offer or at some later date. "'65 To stop short of this important 
this note, none of them supported their decision with any other reasoning other than the Legislative 
History and the Gustafson opinion, nor refuted the other issues outlined. See Broscious v. Children's 
Place Retail Storess, No. 97-5021JCL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 1999); In re 
Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Minn. 1998); Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, No. 
96-251,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16194 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1998); In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 96 
Civ. 3610, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997); Zeid v. Open Envtl. Corp., NO. 
96-12466-EFH,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23469 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 1997); Gannon. 920 F. Supp. at 
566; Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 359; Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., No. 95-1926-
MA,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207 (D. Or. May 9, 1996); Stack, 903 F. Supp. 1361. 
60. See Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 580-81. 
61. See Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375; Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 358; In re WRT Enerxy Sec. 
LitiJ:., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 14009 at* 18-* 19; In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
62. See In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (quoting Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 580-
81); In re WRT Enerxy Sec. LitiJ:., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009 at *18-19; Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 
358; Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375. 
63. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933). 
64. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132. 
65. !d. at 132 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 (1933)); Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 566 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 (1933)); Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., No. 96-12272-DPW, 
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passage would give the impression that the legislative history supports 
eliminating the "trace" principle. A thorough reading of the legislative 
history makes it clear that Congress created more than one exception to 
the general rule that the 1933 Act is limited to initial offerings, one of 
those exceptions being the expansion of who may sue under section 11.66 
B. The Gustafson and N aftalin Opinions 
Another argument commonly used by those who have eliminated the 
"trace" principle is found in both the majority and dissenting opinions of 
Gustafson. 67 The court in Brosious68 set forth this argument, when 
discussing the scope of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act: 
The Court in Gustafson noted that an earlier decision, United States v. 
Naftalin, interpreted "the one provision of the Act that extends 
coverage beyond the regulation of public offerings, § 17(a) of the 1933 
Act." This language implies that section 11 only regulates public 
offerings. The Court explained that "the legislative history relied upon 
in Naftalin showed that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure 
from the general scheme of the Act in this one instance and 'made 
abundantly clear' its intent that § 17(a) have broad coverage. See 
[Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778] (quoting legislative history stating that 
'"fraud or deception in the sale of securities may be prosecuted 
regardless of whether ... or not it is of the class of securities exempted 
under sections 11 or 12, "') 69 
The argument states that, because the Court categorized sections 11 
and 12 as limited when demonstrating the broad scope of section 17(a), 
sections 11 and 12 must be similarly limited in scope. 
This argument, however, is misguided. A closer reading of United 
States v. Naftalin70 is revealing. The full text of the Naftalin opinion 
dealing with this topic is as follows: 
Although it is true that the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the 
regulation of new offerings, respondent's argument fails because the 
antifraud prohibition of § 17 (a) was meant as a major departure from 
that limitation. Unlike much of the rest of the Act, it was intended to 
cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in 
the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22126, at *20 (D. Mass. May 27, 1998) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 
(1933)). 
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994). 
67. See In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; In re WRT Enerxy Sec. Litif?., 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009 at *20-*21. 
68. No. 97-5021JCL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986, at *14. 
69. !d. (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
70. 441 U.S. 768 (1979). 
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trading. This is made abundantly clear both by the statutory language, 
which makes no distinctions between the two kinds of transactions, and 
by the Senate Report, which stated: 
"The act subjects the sale of old or outstanding securities to the 
same criminal penalties and injunctive authority for fraud, 
deception, or misrepresentation as in the case of new issues put out 
after the approval of the act. In other words, fraud or deception in 
the sale of securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether the 
security is old or new, or whether or not it is of the class of 
securities exempted under sections 11 or 12." 
Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933). Respondent 
is undoubtedly correct that [the 1933 and 1934 Acts] prohibit some of 
the same conduct. But "[the] fact that there may well be some overlap 
. . h l ... ,71 ts nett er unusua nor un1 ortunate. 
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In response to this passage, three points are worth making. First, the 
Naftalin Court recognized that although section I7(a) was "a major 
departure" from the primary concern of the 1933 Act, it was not the only 
departure.72 Second, an interpretation that the scope of section II is 
greater than section 12(a), but less than section 17(a), is consistent with 
the Naftalin decision. And finally, the Gustafson and subsequent 
decisions that quote the Senate Report used in Naftalin fail to quote the 
entire relevant text. 
1. Section 17(a) 
The Naftalin Court recognized that although section 17(a) was "a 
major departure" from the primary concern of the I933 Act, it was not 
the only departure. 73 The Court's statement "[u]nlike much of the rest of 
the Act"74 indicates that there are other exceptions. If section 17(a) was 
the only exception, the Court would have left out the words "much of," 
making the statement "unlike the rest of the Act." Furthermore, the Court 
later recognizes that there is some overlap between the I933 Act and the 
1934 Act.75 Because the main focus of the 1934 Act deals with old 
securities, or securities sold after the initial offering, the only reason they 
would mention the overlap is to demonstrate that there are exceptions in 
the 1933 Act that deal with old (or secondary) securities. 
71. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. /d. (emphasis added). 
75. See id. 
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The Court in Gustafson, while attempting to prove that Congress 
intended section 12(a) to be limited only to those who purchased directly 
from the initial offering, noted that Congress cut out an exception to the 
general rule for section 17.76 Quoting Naftalin, the Court noted that this 
was "a major departure from the limitation [of the 1933 Act to new 
offerings]."77 The Court reasoned that because Congress did not make it 
clear that section 12(a) (and section 11, so the argument goes) is an 
exception to the general rule (the general rule being that the 1933 Act 
deals only with initial offerings), these sections are limited to initial 
offerings.78 However, if the Gustafson Court had been specifically 
addressing section 11, it certainly would have noted that Congress did 
make it clear that section 11 has an exception from the general rule.79 
Yet, because this exception only applies to section 11 and not to section 
12(a), it is logical that this was not mentioned by the Court. 
Furthermore, the legislative history did not state that section 17 was 
the only section to deviate from the primary purpose of the Act. 80 
Because such a statement is lacking, it can easily be concluded that 
Congress intended other exceptions. This notion finds great support in 
the previously cited legislative history. It also finds support in the fact 
that as far back as 1951, circuit courts were allowing a private cause of 
action for security holders who purchased securities in a secondary 
offering under section 11.81 Congress has had plenty of time to amend 
and make clear its intent. If that intent is different from that which the 
courts have articulating, then Congress would certainly have made that 
known by now. 
2. The Naftalin decision 
An interpretation that the scope of section 11 is greater than section 
12(a), but less than section 17(a), is consistent with the Naftalin decision. 
The Gustafson court held that because, as stated in the Naftalin decision, 
the legislative history specifically stated that section 17 was broad as 
opposed to sections 11 and 12, section 12 must be limited.82 While this 
may be true,83 the same limitation does not necessarily apply with the 
76. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577-78. 
77. /d. at 577 (quoting Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78). 
78. See id. The court in Brosious used this line of reasoning to argue that Gustafwn 
eliminated the "trace" rule. See Brosious, No. 97-5021JCL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986, at *14. 
79. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 (1933). 
80. SeeS. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933). 
81. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). 
82. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577-78. 
83. For our purposes, it is true because the Supreme Court said so. 
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same degree to section I1. As long as sections II and 12 are more 
limited than section I7, the statement remains true. 
Section 12(a) is limited to securities purchased in an initial public 
offering, while section 11 is limited to securities purchased or traced to 
an initial public offering. Yet, both sections 11 and 12 are more limiting 
than section 17(a). Section 17(a) encompasses "an offer or sale of 
securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution or in the course 
of ordinary market trading."84 Section 17(a)'s scope encompasses all 
securities transactions; this is broader than the scope of section 11, which 
only covers transactions that either took place during an initial offering 
or are traceable to such an offering. Section 12's scope, in turn, is the 
least expansive of the three; it includes only those transactions that occur 
during an initial public offering. 
3. The Legislative History 
The Gustafson and subsequent decisions that quote the Senate Report 
used in Naftalin fail to quote the entire relevant text. 85 The Naftalin Court 
was not trying to insinuate that sections 11 and 12 are identical. Rather, it 
was illustrating the broad scope of section 17(a). This is illustrated by 
looking at the entire Naftalin quote, a portion of which is often omitted.86 
"In other words, fraud or deception in the sale of securities may be 
prosecuted regardless of whether the security is old or new, or whether 
or not it is of the class of securities exempted under sections I I or I 2."87 
If we read the legislative history in such a way that "will avoid a reading 
which renders some words altogether redundant,"88 it is clear that 
Naftalin does not purport to similarly limit sections 11 and I2. According 
to Gustafson, section 12(a) is limited to new securities, defining an old 
security as any security not sold during an initial offering. Thus, if the 
Court in Naftalin was placing the scope of sections 11 and 12 in the same 
category, then the phrase "old or new" and "the class of securities 
exempted under sections 11 or 12" would mean the same thing. 
However, if we read the statement in a way that avoids conflict, then it is 
clear that the scope of sections 11 and 12 are different. 
84. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (emphasis added). 
85. See Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 577-78; Brosious, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986 at *14. 
86. See id. 
87. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
88. Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 574. 
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C. The Gustafson Dissenting Opinions 
Another argument raised by the proponents of eliminating the "trace" 
principle is found in the two Gustafson dissenting opinions. In her 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated with regard to sections 11 and 12, "There 
is no dispute that the latter two provisions apply only to public offerings 
- or, to be precise, to transactions subject to registration."89 In Justice 
Thomas's dissent, he stated, "Nor did Congress limit section 12(2) to 
issuers, as it chose to do with other provisions that are limited to initial 
distributions. See section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2)."90 
The courts in both In re Summit Medical Systems, Inc. and In re WRT 
Energy take these portions of the opinion as an affirmation that the 
"trace" principle has been effectively overruled.91 
A closer look at the two dissenting statements reveals that they are 
consistent with the "trace" principle when taken in the context in which 
they were made. As District Judge Robert W. Sweet noted in Adair v. 
Bristol Technology Systems, Inc., in context, Justice Ginsberg's 
"statement is intended to support Ginsberg's view that section 12(2), in 
contrast with section 11, is not limited to public offerings, but rather 
includes within its sweep the private securities transaction at issue."92 
Judge Sweet's argument is particularly enlightening when considering 
that the main issue in Gustafson was "whether [the] right of rescission 
extends to a private, secondary transaction.'m Section 11 is limited to 
public offerings (whether initial or secondary is irrelevant for this 
analysis). In referencing section 11, Justice Ginsberg was simply 
contrasting the scope of section 11 (limited to public offerings) with 
what she felt the scope of section 12 should be (encompassing both 
public and private offerings). The statement should not be read to mean 
that section 11 's scope does not include the "trace" principle. 
Addressing Justice Thomas's dissent, Judge Sweet further noted: 
In his textual analysis of§ 12(2), Justice Thomas contends that § 11 's 
text limiting liability to "every person who was a director of ... or 
partner in the issuer" at the time of filing indicates that its scope is 
limited to initial public offerings, whereas the absence of such language 
in § 12(2) is persuasive that private transactions not involving an issuer 
are included. There is no dispute here, however, that § 11 liability 
extends beyond its specifically enumerated potential defendants, or that 
89. /d. at 600. 
90. /d. at 590. 
91. See In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 96 
Civ. 3610, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009, at *20-21. 
92. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132. 
93. Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added). 
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liability is limited to public offerings. Therefore, as with Justice 
Ginsberg's proposition, this statement is consistent with retention of the 
tracing requirement for standing to sue under§ 11.94 
131 
As Judge Sweet suggests, Justice Thomas was using the description 
of potential defendants to show that section 11 is limited to initial public 
offerings and then contrasting that to the broad scope of section 12(2). 
Nowhere in Justice Thomas's dissent does he suggest that those who can 
trace their security to a defective registration statement issued in an 
initial public offering do not have standing to sue. Furthermore, the fact 
that both sections 11 and 12 are limited to initial public offerings is 
consistent with the "trace" principle. Only those investors who can trace 
their security back to the initial offering have standing to sue. While 
Justice Thomas's statement may not actively support the "trace" 
principle, it certainly can be read to be consistent with it. 
The courts that eliminated the "trace" principle seem to think that the 
legislative history combined with the Gustafson opinion are persuasive 
enough to ignore all other arguments raised, for they fail to address 
them.95 
D. The Statutory Text of Section 11 
When trying to decide the meaning of a statute courts look to the 
statute itself. 96 Several portions of the statute show that Congress 
intended section 11 to apply to transactions other than the initial public 
offering. First, the statute gives a cause of action to "any person 
acquiring such security."97 Second, the statute specifically contemplates 
the price of the securities to be different from the initial offering price at 
the time the suit is commenced.98 Third, the statute has a higher standard 
for plaintiffs if an earnings statement has been on the market for a period 
of twelve months prior to the effective date of the registration 
statement.99 
94. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132. 
95. Although the court opinions cited do not address the following arguments, in the 
memorandum prepared by Dignity during the Hertzberg hearing, Dignity articulates the opposing 
argument. This opposing argument is incorporated below. See Answering Brief of 
Defendant/Appellees, Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1076 (No. 98-16394). 
96. "[W]hen interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its text." United States v. 
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350,356 (1994). 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
98. See id. § 77k(e). 
99. See id. § 77k(a). 
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1. "Any person acquiring such security" 
The statute gives a cause of action to "any person acquiring such 
security."100 The court in Hertzberg, while finding that the "trace" 
principle is valid, stated, "The term 'any person' is quite broad, and we 
give words their ordinary meaning. According to Webster's Dictionary, 
'any' means 'one, no matter what one'; 'ALL'; 'one or more 
discriminately from those of a kind. "' 101 Likewise, the court in Schwartz 
v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc. held that "under the plain language of § 11, 
any purchaser may bring a claim as long as he can prove that the 
securities acquired were issued in connection with a false registration 
statement, i.e., if the shares can be traced to the offering."102 
Furthermore, the court in In re Fine Host Corp. noted an important 
distinction between the texts of section 11 and section 12(2): "Section 12 
expressly limits recovery to only those purchasers who purchase their 
shares directly from a seller who makes a false or misleading 
prospectus .... In contrast, section 11 permits recovery by 'any person 
. . h . ,,10:l 
acqumng sue secunty. -
While the preceding argument seems strong, none of the courts 
focused on the pivotal word in the statute, "any person acquiring such 
security."104 In the Defendants/Appellees' brief, Dignity points out that 
nowhere does Congress define the word "such". 105 Dignity then traces 
the history of the 1933 Act, pointing to what was happening at the time 
and arguing that the term "such security" is meant to limit the scope of 
the remedy, making it only available to those who purchased the security 
from the initial offering. 106 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument, holding that "[t]he limitation on 'any person' is that he or she 
must have purchased 'such security."' 107 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[ w ]hen 
interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its text." 108 
Furthermore, when the text is clear, no further analysis is needed. 109 
I 00. See id. § 77k(e). 
101. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 (citations omitted). 
102. Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 556. 
103. In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D. Conn. 1998) (citations 
omitted). See also Danis v. U.S. Comm., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923,931-32 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (emphasis added). 
105. See Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at II, Hertzberg, 191 F. 3d at 1076 (No. 98-
16394). 
106. See id. 
107. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080. 
108. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. at 356. 
109. See Connecticut Nat'! Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). The Court stated: 
"We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
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Webster's Dictionary defines "such" as "of the same class, type, or sort; 
in the same category; similar."110 Applying that definition to the text, the 
term "such security" means a security that falls within the category set 
forth previously in the text, i.e. a security sold under a faulty registration 
statement. 
Nowhere in the language of section 11 does it state that you must 
purchase your securities during the initial offering. Instead, it clearly 
states that "any person acquiring such security"111 may sue. Because the 
plain meaning of the text is available, logical, and unambiguous, no court 
need look further to determine who has standing to sue. 
2. The damages provision 
Another portion of the statute that supports the "trace" principle is 
found in the damages provision where the statute allows for a price other 
than the initial offerings price. The court in Adair reasoned that "[i]f 
Congress intended to limit liability to purchasers in the [Initial Public 
Offering], the language could simply read 'at the offering price.' Instead, 
the language permits recovery for purchases at prices other than the 
offering price, as long as the liability is so limited." 112 As the court in 
Hertzberg points out, "[s]uch provision would be unnecessary if only a 
person who bought in the actual offering could recover, since, by 
definition, such a person would have paid 'the price at which the security 
was offered to the public."' 113 
The Defendants in Adair argued that a price differential could occur 
during an Initial Public Offering if that offering were a shelf offering, 
and thus, the language in the statute was necessary to account for shelf 
registrations. 114 As the Adair court correctly pointed out, this argument 
fails because shelf registrations are allowed under Rule 415, which was 
promulgated in 1982, almost fifty years after the 1933 Act was passed. 115 
In Hertzberg, the Defendants argued that Congress, in providing for 
a price different than that of the initial offering, was simply protecting 
means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, 
this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete."' /d. 
II 0. WEBSTER'S SECOND INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1941 ). 
Ill. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
112. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133. 
113. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080. 
114. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133-34. A shelf registration is where a company is allowed to 
register securities, but must wait for a certain amount of time before offering them to the public. 
Thus, under a shelf registration, it would be possible to have a time gap between the effective date of 
the registration statement and the time that the company offers the securities to the general public. 
115. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133-34. 
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investors against "unscrupulous" brokers. 116 However, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument because "it makes the unlikely assumption that 
Congress chose to prevent victims of broker fraud from recovering the 
additional amount out of which they were cheated." 117 
Other courts have used the damages provision as support for the 
"trace" principle. In so doing, they have held that because of the 
appropriation for damages based on the securities price being different 
than that of the initial public offering, the drafters intended section 11 to 
I d . 118 app y to secon ary transactiOns. 
3. The heightened burden for plaintiffs starting a year after the effective 
date of the registration statement 
Statutory support for the "trace" principle is also found in the 
heightened burden for plaintiffs starting a year after the effective date of 
the registration statement. Section ll(a) provides that a plaintiff must 
show reliance on the untrue statement found in the registration statement 
if there has been an earning statement on the market that covers a period 
of at least a year after the registration statement. 119 Furthermore, the 
legislative history on the 1934 amendment, which added the requirement 
of reliance where there was a valid earning statement, declared, "The 
basis of this provision is that in all likelihood the purchase and price of 
the security purchased after publication of such an earning statement will 
be predicated upon that statement rather than upon the information 
d. I d . . ,12o tsc ose upon regtstratwn. 
Schwartz recognized the implications of this section 11 provision 
when it stated, "By requiring those who purchase registered stock after 
the publication of the twelve-month earning statement to prove reliance, 
the statute contemplates relief for those who purchase shares after the 
public offering."121 Congress realized that the price of securities 
fluctuates with information received by the market about a certain 
company. Without this provision, there could be an investor who only 
purchased securities from companies with known faulty registration 
statements. By doing this, the investor would always be able to recover 
his purchase price from companies whose stock prices dropped, but keep 
116. See Hertzberg. 191 F.3d at 1080; Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at 11, 
Hertzberg (No. 98-16394); The argument is that an unscrupulous broker could actually charge more 
for the security than the company had offered it for, thus creating a difference in the price. 
117. Hertzberg, 191 F.3dat 1080n.6. 
118. See Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 556; Cooperman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22126 at *20. 
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
120. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1082-83 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1838, at 41 ( 1933)). 
121. Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 556. See also Cooperman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22126 at *19-
*20. 
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those stocks whose prices went up. While the example is a bit far 
fetched, it illustrates the need for Congress to include the reliance 
requirement under section 11. 
In Hertzberg, Dignity argued that when the 1933 Act was passed it 
was common for a public offering to take more than a year. 122 Because a 
public offering could last for more than a year, the "recognition that 
Section 11 claims may be based upon purchases more than a year after 
the effective date of registration" is no support for the "trace" 
principle. 123 Assuming that Dignity is correct, their argument certainly 
does not preclude the "trace" principle. 
E. Plain Logic and the World We Live In 
Putting aside Congress's intent, a look at the remedies from a logical 
perspective is worthwhile. Our society has become extremely complex. 
The price a particular security sells for is a function of multiple factors, 
one of which is the registration statement. No one has argued or can 
argue that once a security is sold in a public offering, the registration 
statement ceases to be useful. In many situations, the registration 
statement must be updated to accurately reflect the company's current 
situation. 124 Dignity noted in Hertzberg that 
individuals who make aftermarket purchases of stock originally issued 
in prior public offerings or in private placements are no less affected by 
a false registration statement than those making aftermarket purchases 
of stock that was sold in the registered public offering. . . . Such a 
distinction simply introduces an element of arbitrariness and 
unfairness. 125 
Yet, is it really that arbitrary or unfair? Securities purchased prior to 
the defective registration statement were priced according to all of the 
required correct information. Thus, their original price was "correct", for 
lack of a better word. Any trading after that point until the faulty 
registration statement would also be "correct." Thus, only those 
securities bought or sold immediately after the faulty registration 
statement would be affected. For those transactions, the "trace" principle 
may seem arbitrary and unfair. Yet, because the majority of the 
transactions occurring during a public offering will consist of the 
securities being offered, this rule encompasses a majority of the affected 
122. See Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at 18, Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1076 (No. 98-
16394). 
123. See id. 
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77. 
125. See Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at 34, Hertzberg, 191 F. 3d at I 076 (No. 98-
16394). 
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investors. While the "trace" principle might not be perfect, it is the best 
that we have under the statutory language of section 11. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When the stock market crashed back in 1929, Congress knew that 
changes had to be made. Back then, our society was significantly 
different than it is today, yet somehow we trust that Congress's 
intentions from the 1930s are still appropriate today. Whether or not this 
is true is a moot point now. The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
they intend to follow those intentions. The question now becomes, what 
exactly did Congress intend for section 11? Many courts, even prior to 
Gustafson, felt that Congress intended to limit section 11 to public 
offerings, but other courts saw an expansive section 11. 
When all of the arguments on both sides are lined up and compared, 
no one side is an absolute winner. However, after looking at the evidence 
presented by the different courts throughout the country, it seems clear 
that the 73rd Congress did not intend section 11 to be limited only to 
those investors who purchased their securities in an initial public 
offering. The 73rd Congress intended to give standing to sue to those 
investors that can trace their securities back to a faulty registration 
statement. 
James E. Shapiro 
